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ABSTRACT
Presented here are techniques for the residential deployment of common Wi-Fi®
services with an optimized Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) Identity PreShared Key (iPSK) flow.

The techniques presented herein avoid the use of an

Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server for clients whose entries are
absent through the upfront use of bloom filter information provided by an AAA server.
The techniques presented herein can also be used for Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2)
iPSK optimization or SAE (Wi-Fi® Protected Access 3 (WPA3) personal), which has
more latency sensitive call flow due to SAE auth commit timeouts consideration.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Today, personal Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), such as WPA2 PreShared Key (PSK) and WPA3 SAE, are widely used by customers in places such as
residential apartments, motels, restaurants, etc. There is a concern regarding the network
security when using such WLANs. For example, in a multi-tenant apartment building,
managed Wi-Fi is a service that may be provided by a landlord or association. Each
apartment tenant will connect to the same single Service Set Identifier (SSID) and a
common password may be provided to each tenant. The use of a common password creates
a significant security issue (e.g., when a tenant leaves the apartment, as well as with the
password being common is available to move-out tenants). As such, the there is a need to
provide individual passwords that are unique to each tenant.

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020

1

5933X

2

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 2836 [2020]

As illustrated by the above example, it is common place that all users of a WLAN
use a common/shared password to connect to the WLAN. Such setup is typically a WPA2Personal network deployment where all tenants share same SSID but have their unique
password for using common Wi-Fi connectivity. WPA3-Personal aka Simultaneous
Authentication Of Equals (SAE) is robust to offline, dictionary, and brute force attacks.
However, even SAE is vulnerable (e.g., in above multi-tenant apartment building
deployment) to attacks using a single one time password guess to implement an active
attack.
One solution to this issue is to provide private password to each user who is going
to connect to a WLAN, such as Identity PSK (iPSK) based on Media Access Control
(MAC) addresses. For iPSK, the password for each client MAC address is typically
configured in the AAA server. Every time a client wants to associate to a WLAN that has
MAC filtering configured, the AAA server has to be queried to obtain the password
configured for the client and use it for association. The password is required during
association for WPA2 PSK and for WPA3 SAE authentication.
There are use-cases where some users/guests are given a common WLAN password
and the entries for such client's MAC address are not configured in the AAA server, but
the user can still connect to the WLAN with a pre-configured WLAN password. This
causes latency (especially in clustered Wireless LAN Controller (WLC) cloud deployment)
during the association process, even though the client is using the default WLAN password.
This latency is because the Access Point (AP)/WLC still has to wait for the AAA server to
process whether the client was configured with a password.
FIG. 1, below, illustrates a standard/conventional SAE iPSK call flow
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FIG. 1
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There are a number of improvements required with the standard SAE iPSK shown
in FIG. 1. For example, in the above standard call flow of FIG. 1, the clients can timeout
or attempt to roam to another AP if there is significant latency between messages 4 and 7.
This will be dependent on the ISE message exchange and, typically, a client’s SAE auth
commit timeout is in milliseconds, thus it can be a deployment impact issue specifically in
cloud multi-cluster WLC deployments. As such, it would be possible to reduce AAA/ISE
load by avoiding contacting the AAA server for clients for which it is known that the AAA
server does not have the password and policy details. In addition, for clients who are guests
and don’t have an entry in the AAA server, there is no need to contact the AAA server to
obtain the password and policy information. When the password and policy information
is absent for those clients, the WLC/AP could fallback to use the WLAN password.
However, the above access request and response with the AAA server leads to latency in
client association and, in particular, in cloud deployments. In addition, in SAE iPSK, as a
client is waiting for auth commit, timeout can occur if there is more latency. Overall, it
may be possible to reduce network load and messages for ISE communication.
FIG. 2, below, illustrates a call flow in accordance with the techniques presented
herein.
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FIG. 2
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In FIG. 2, flow message 4 is not per client, but instead an out of band periodic
RADIUS message containing consolidated bit vector bloom filter details for all clients
present in the AAA server.

The AAA server and WLC shall have similar hash

functions/logic to utilize the shared bloom filter details during lookup at the WLC. For
guest clients sure to be absent in the bloom filter, the WLC shall avoid messages
AAR/AAA (5,6 in above standard flow), thus reducing latency for client association and
load on the AAA server as well.
In accordance with the techniques presented herein, the client (apartment tenant)
join/association flow shall be as below:
1. Client provisioning in the AAA server or ISE shall be done as it's done today
with ISE having entries for the client MAC PSK/SAE password and other
policies.
2. The AAA server or ISE shall maintain a bloom filter for all the client MACs
having common bit vector and send the same to WLC.
3. The AAA server periodically sends this bloom filter bit vector details to the
WLC containing the client entries bit vector details for which it has entries.
4. When a client tries to associate to the WLC/AP, the WLC/AP it will check
whether that client is absent "definitely not present" using the bit vector
provided by the AAA and with input as client MAC. If client is present which
will be in this case then WLC shall be knowing that client entry is present in
AAA server so shall be going to AAA server using Access request/accept as
done today.

In accordance with the techniques presented herein, the client (guest) join/association
flow shall be as below:
1. The AAA server periodically sends this bloom filter bit vector details to the WLC
containing the client entries bit vector details for which it has entries as mentioned
above.
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2. When a guest client tries to associate to the WLC/AP, the WLC/AP then it will
check that the client is absent "definitely not present" using the bit vector provided
by the AAA and with input as client MAC.
3. In this case, the client MAC shall be absent in bloom filter then it will indicate that
the client MAC is absent at the AAA server. The WLC shall utilize the locally
configured WLAN password and local policy, thereby avoiding contacting the
AAA server and saving the flow for the WLC to the AAA server of Access
request/accept.
In accordance with the techniques presented herein, the client removal from the AAA
server (tenant moving out but visited as guest) flow shall be as follows:
1. The AAA server shall be updated with removal of client MAC entry.
2. The AAA server shall provision the updated bloom filter (periodically for
optimized performance) to the WLC.
3. When a client joins and an entry is not found in the bloom filter, then the client
association flow shall use local WLAN password and policy avoiding going to
the ISE.
Another case when, during the periodic refresh, the client is removed from the AAA
server, but the bloom filter is not updated at the WLC (transient), then the flow shall be as
follows:
1. The WLC finds the client entry in the bloom filter and attempts to send the AAR
to the AAA server.
2. The AAA server notifies the WLC that the client is absent and there is a fallback
to the WLAN password or configuration
FIG. 3, below, illustrates aspects of the techniques presented herein. In FIG. 3, the
client 1) is not configured, which maps to the guest case described above. The client 2) is
configured, which maps to tenants using common WIFI service. Client 3) is also not
configured, which is the refresh window case when client is removed from the AAA server,
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but periodic bloom filter update is not received at the WLC and, for those few clients, the
WLC still contacts the AAA server and there is fallback to the WLAN password.

FIG. 3

Accordingly, even during this refresh window where the client bloom filter if not
updated, the operation is acceptable. In particular, those clients removed from AAA
server during this refresh windows shall result in a query and a fallback to the WLAN
password.
In another embodiment the bloom filters can be configured per client MAC and per
WLAN.
A still other solution approach is:
•

Out of band AAA server provides (using RADIUS COA) the WLC with client
MAC detail/presence.
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•

The WLC just maintains the client presence in local bloom filter.

•

On client association, the WLC uses the local maintained bloom filter for the
identification of whether to use locally configured password and policy for client
association or contact the AAA server.

•

This method is different from previously mentioned approaches in the sense only
the client MAC is shared with the WLC by the AAA server. This is also an
efficient embodiment/variation as the WLC need not maintain client DB for
clients, which can be huge in number as it is not possible to know when and who
will be joining and just maintains bit vector for bloom filter for lookup.
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